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Abstract 
This paper will consider how a media installation called the diplorasis, aims at rethinking 
understandings of the body in space and time. Through the diplorasis there is an attempt to reconsider 
the scientific view on the human eyes in relation to art historical accounts of the representational image 
and to revise these from the perspective of philosophical texts on the image and its relation to an 
embodied and a disembodied perception (Deleuze, Bergson, Merleau-Ponty). Through this mediated 
visuality, the prosthetic body becomes re-articulated via a re-framing of the relations between 
perception and recollection. 
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Introduction 
This article begins by re-considering linear 
perspectival representation and the divide this 
assumes between body and space, in 
comparison to alternative modes such as 
stereoscopic representation, where this 
distinction is absent. In Hubert Damisch’s A 
Theory of /Cloud/ (2002), the cloud, due to its 
very nature of being a ‘body without a surface’ 
(2002: 127), provides a useful prompt to re-think 
another element that poses a problem to the 
perspectival model, the human body. We need to 
posit here that the human body is a ‘body 
without a surface’, and as Deleuze and Guattari 
have suggested, a ‘body without organs’1 (this 
will be explained later). The boundary between 
body and space can be re-thought by 
questioning the solidity of the body itself, as it 
changes in its increasing interaction with a 
technological ‘prosthetic’ interface. The 
prosthetic re-defines not only the limit and the 
singularity of the body, but also its duration. The 
diplorasis2, my own media installation, explores 
                                                        
1 See Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, ‘6. November 28, 1947: How Do 
You Make Yourself a Body Without Organs?’ in Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia: A Thousand Plateaus, trans. Brian Massumi (London: 
Continuum, 2004 [1980]), 149-166. 
2 The diplorasis has been published in various platforms and 
presented in exhibitions. For visual material on the diplorasis visit 
http://www.para-sight.org/installations-devices/4589953031. The list 
of publications on the diplorasis includes: Themistokleous, George. 
2019. ‘Digitally Stitching Stereoscopic Vision.’ In: Ewing, S. and Troiani, I., 
eds. Visual Methodologies in Architectural Research. Bristol: Intellect 
(forthcoming); Themistokleous, George. 2019. ‘Embodiment, Utopia and 
the Digitized Image.’ The Site Magazine vol. 39 (forthcoming); 
an-other understanding of the body, the 
prosthetic body as we interpret it today. 
Diplorasis derives from the Greek diplo and 
orasi, and is translated as doubled sight.  
The understanding of the cognitive 
functioning of this “other” body begins by re-
considering the notion of duration through the 
diplorasis and in relation to the understanding 
of duration by Henri Bergson in Matter and 
Memory (first published in 1896) and by Gilles 
Deleuze in Bergsonism (first published in 1968). 
The diplorasis attempts to re-think how a 
stereoscopic vision and a cinematic vision might 
be re-configured and synthesized via digital 
technologies. The stereoscopic images projected 
in the diplorasis depict the observer’s own body 
digitally stitched and looped backwards. In other 
words, the participant perceives oneself in 
three-dimensions and walking backwards. As the 
projected body stills revolve, they become 
digitally misaligned and manipulated. As a 
                                                                                   
Themistokleous, George. 2018. E-topia: Utopia after the Mediated Body. 
Open Library of Humanities, 4(2), pp. 1-27; Themistokleous, George. 
2017. ‘Autoscopic Space.’ IDEA JOURNAL, November, 76-87; 
Themistokleous, George. 2017. ‘Mediating the Interval.’ Image 
Temporality: The Relation of Time, Space and Reception of Visual Media, 
Yearbook of Moving Image Studies (YoMIS). Edited by Lars C. Grabbe, 
Patrick Rupert-Kruse and Norbert M. Schmitz. Darmstadt: Büchner-
Verlag. 156-179.; Themistokleous, George. 2016. ‘Image as Virtual 
Construction.’ Inter- fotografía y arquitectura / inter- photography and 
architecture. Edited by Rubén A. Alcolea and Jorge Tárrago Mingo. 
Pamblona: Servicio de Publicaciones Universidad de Navarra. 190-99; 
Themistokleous, George. 2016. ‘Diplorasis: The Other Side of Vision.’ 
Acadia 2016 Posthuman Frontiers: Data, Designers, and Cognitive 
Machines: Projects Catalog of the 36th Annual Conference of the 
Association for Computer Aided Design in Architecture. Edited by Kathy 
Velikov, Sandra Manninger and Matias Del Campo. Acadia Publishing 
Company. 146 – 151. 
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consequence, the digital stitching of the body is 
tampered with. This reduplicated and projected 
self, three-dimensionally simulated, begins to 
question the interrelation between the 
perceiving self and the self as an image. For the 
duration of the visual experience the bodily 
viewer confronts and constructs (through the 
stereoscopic operation) himself/herself as 
image. The durational image, central to the 
Bergsonian proposition and later expanded by 
Deleuze with his idea of the 'movement-image'3, 
is key to the understanding of the cognitive 
function of this “other” body provoked by this 
“other” vision.   
How is a new understanding of bodily 
duration, explored via the diplorasis, accounted 
for in visual representation? The question of 
corporeality and space made possible by the use 
of non-perspectival visual devices, leads to the 
formation of an “other” body that breaks free 
from the dominant perspectival rule of a 
singular, authoritative vision ruling a singular 
and separate body. An-other definition of the 
body begins to challenge the very notion of 
representing the body in linear perspective and 
provides another understanding of subjectivity 
in the discourse about space. The “other” body 
explored here is the infantile body in Lacan’s 
Mirror Stage (1949) the experimental body in 
Stratton’s mirror experiments such as the 
inverted goggle experiment (1897) discussed by 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty in The Phenomenology of 
Perception (1945), and my body in the diplorasis. 
The categories of “real”, “illusory” and 
“simulated” overlap and diverge into plural 
combinations of partial representations, 
proto/retro-representation or non-
representation, thus triggering different 
understandings and formations of the body in 
space. In this experiment, the role of the 
“prosthetic body” is to structure the varied and 
critical relation between body and space, haptic 
and optic, visual representation and actual 
vision in the examples cited above. In this sense, 
the body is already reconsidered as a non-
localized place that correlates, via a 
technological interface, to other bodies, which 
can be spatially and visually extensive and 
intensive. In this respect, the interface is the 
active object that re-defines the subject. The 
instrumental “prosthetic” condition, intruding 
                                                        
3 See Chapter 4. The Movement Image and Its Three Varieties: Second 
Commentary on Bergson. Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement 
Image, trans. H. Tomlinson, B. Habberjam (London: Continuum, 2005 
[1983]). 
into and extruding from the multi-body, enables 
the correlation and superimposition of varied 
bodily and spatial intensities leading to the 
formulation of a uniquely contemporary, yet 
undefined, “representational spatial body”. My 
research aims at articulating this new 
formulation through, firstly, theories which have 
been tested as constructs, and secondly, 
constructs which have been theorised (including 
my own experimental devices). Of the latter, the 
diplorasis becomes a tool for investigating 
duration in order to inform new understandings 
of the representational process. 
Perspectival and Stereoscopic Media 
In his analysis of the perspectival system in 
A Theory of /Cloud/, Hubert Damisch notes that 
‘In effect, geometrical perspective does away 
with the very element of vision, the atmosphere, 
within which images are conveyed. It reveals 
perspective as a structure of exclusion’ 
(Damisch, 2002: 136). Damisch unfolds the 
complexity of this system, as it constantly had to 
re-think its own pictorial and semantic limits 
and thus to re-conceive its own constitution; in 
this respect, the cloud as an atmospheric 
condition becomes a significant tool for 
examining the perspectival model. The key 
limitation of perspective lies with the imposition 
and reduction of the image to a predetermined 
point of view. The principle that structures the 
image according to geometrical rules persists 
well into the post-digital age. According to 
Damisch, ‘perspective only needs to “know” 
things that it can reduce to its own order, things 
that occupy a place and the contour of which 
can be defined by lines’ (2002, 124). The cloud(s), 
as ‘bodies without surface’ manifest ‘the 
limitations of the perspective code, reveals the 
perspective as a structure of exclusion’ (Damish 
2002, 124). To this extent, a contemporary 
understanding of the prosthetic body, in a 
similar way to Damisch’s account of cloud, will 
reveal that the perspectival system is not able to 
represent this type of body. This is due to the 
fact that the body here, as I further elaborate 
below, is considered in its cognitive relation to 
the image. It excludes the sensory faculty of the 
body. In order to unravel the possibility of 
representing this other body, it will be more 
useful to turn to an alternative means of 
representation: the stereoscope.  
The stereoscope – a device by which two 
photographs of the same object taken at slightly 
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different angles are viewed together, creating an 
impression of depth and solidity - integrates the 
physiological operation of the eyes into its 
technical construct. With the separate eyes 
focusing on two non-identical reflected images, 
the optical binocular functioning of the 
stereoscope simulates an illusion of three-
dimensional depth. The duration of normal 
binocular convergence is prolonged in the 
stereoscope, and when its two separate images 
converge, the simulated image “floats”, and the 
viewer is made aware that the resulting 
synthesis is ready to disintegrate back into 
shifting planar projections. Merleau-Ponty 
articulates this fusion of the two images by 
claiming that 
The unity of binocular vision and with it the 
depth without which it cannot come about 
is, therefore, there from the very moment at 
which the monocular images are presented 
as ‘disparate’. When I look into the 
stereoscope, a totality presents itself in 
which already the possible order takes 
shape and the situation is foreshadowed 
(Merleau-Ponty 2009, 305). 
Whilst the two monocular images converge 
in binocular vision to create the impression of a 
single image, we are constantly aware that this 
convergence is composed of a synthetic 
duration. The stereoscope, invented in the 1830s, 
formulated a new relation between the observer 
and the image. According to art historian 
Jonathan Crary, the stereoscopic system 
reconstructs the relation between observer and 
image. He writes: ‘The Wheatstone model made 
clear the disjunction between experience and its 
cause... the stereoscope also required the 
corporeal adjacency and immobility of the 
observer’ (Crary 1990, 129). The means for re-
creating three-dimensional depth through a 
virtual projection blurred the very boundary 
between the virtual and the actual. Crary quotes 
Sir David Brewster who writes that the 
stereoscopic image depends on ‘the subsequent 
play of the optical axes varying themselves 
successively upon, and unifying, the similar 
points in each picture that correspond to 
different distances from the observer’ (Crary 
1990, 120, 122). This implies that ‘there must be 
enough points in the image that require 
significant changes in the angle of convergence, 
this is an object filled space’ (Crary 1990, 124). 
The pulsating rhythm of the image reproduces a 
hallucinatory field of dissonance. This field 
alludes to a virtual implosion of the object into 
points that constantly diverge and converge. The 
stereoscope, in this respect, becomes the 
medium that most closely captures the state of 
Deleuzian duration4.  
The diplorasis becomes an attempt to 
inhabit this indeterminate zone, not only 
through the visual experience, but also in the 
attempt to try to re-think how the body might 
breach the space implied by the stereoscopic 
device. There is an attempt to re-think the atopic 
nature of the stereoscope and the immobility of 
the observer that is assumed by the 
stereoscope. As such, the diplorasis does not 
take the illusion of three-dimensional depth as 
the primary scope of the device but rather tries 
to re-enact and extend the indeterminate zone 
which this type of space assumes.  
The diplorasis is a multi-media 
installation/device of my own making (2014-
2019). It takes the form of a mirrored corridor. 
When the participant enters the corridor he/she 
will observe the sandblasted translucent screen 
at the far end of the corridor that outlines a 
mechanical instrument. Within this glass panel is 
a cavity in the shape of a human head, with two 
peepholes. The participant who walks towards 
the screen at the far end of the corridor will 
position his/her head inside of this cavity. When 
the participant looks through the peepholes 
she/he will encounter a stereoscopic projection 
of themselves from previous instances inside the 
corridor space. The stereoscopic images will 
then be replaced with another view of the 
participant, as the images continuously change 
they become increasingly misaligned and 
manipulated. When viewing the projected 
images one becomes aware that their image was 
captured from the previous instances when they 
were walking along the corridor; that is literally 
the space behind the viewer’s back (at the very 
moment when they are seeing themselves). 
Behind the scenes various Raspberry Pi 
computers are connected to Arduino micro-
                                                        
4 Crary writes: ‘The stereoscope could be said to constitute what Gilles 
Deleuze calls a “Riemann space,” after the German mathematician 
Georg Riemann (1826-1866). And then quotes Deleuze and Guattari: 
“Each vicinity in a Riemann space is like a shred of Euclidian space but 
the linkage between one vicinity and the next is not defined… Riemann 
space at its most general thus presents itself as an amorphous 
collection of pieces that are juxtaposed but not attached to each 
other.” See Crary, Techniques of the Observer, 126. For more on 
Deleuze’s writing on the stereoscope and Riemann space see: Gilles 
Deleuze, Difference and Repetition (London: Bloomsbury, 1994[1968]): 
64, 240. 
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controllers, DSLR cameras, LCD screens. 
Essentially the participant triggers sensors that 
capture his image, split and manipulate it and 
then send it to LCD screens for stereoscopic 
projection. Before discussing the durational 
implications of the diplorasis, we must turn to 
how duration is defined by the body, according 
to the work of Bergson and Deleuze. 
Convergence: formation of the dispersed 
body 
In one of his major philosophical works 
Matter and Memory (1896), Henri Bergson 
formulates a theory of duration that is based 
upon a definition of matter as resolving into 
‘numberless vibrations, all bound up with each 
other, and travelling in every direction like 
shivers through an immense body’ (1991, 208). 
Our perception is thus a conductor to this 
flowing matter, storing and sorting memory 
images in a time that is continuously becoming – 
past and present are co-extensive. Bergson’s 
work on duration is a criticism of the notion of 
scientific time, exemplified by Einstein’s theory 
of relativity. As Deleuze states,  
What he [Bergson] condemns from the start 
is the whole combination of space and time 
into a badly analyzed composite, where 
space is considered as ready-made, and 
time, in consequence as a fourth dimension 
of space. And this spatialization of time is 
undoubtedly inseparable from science 
(1988, 86). 
This concept of duration is centered on the 
body being the primal image that structures and 
coordinates the synthesis of images that are 
both external, objects, and internal, memories, 
to it. According to Bergson, ‘As my body moves in 
space, all the other images vary, while that 
image, my body, remains invariable. I must 
therefore make it a center to which I refer all the 
other images’ (1991, 46). This invariability of the 
body is problematic because it creates a 
separation between the subject (body image) 
and the object (other images). The contradiction 
in Bergson’s theory of duration lies in locating 
the body as the central image, thus spatially 
defining the body. While Deleuze uses Bergson’s 
duration to develop his own philosophical work 
(Bergsonism, 1966; Cinema 1, 1983), he is aware of 
this contradiction and proposes a different 
analysis of the body. This becomes evident in 
Deleuze’s theory of the Body without Organs – 
BwO – developed with Felix Guattari in the 
double volume Capitalism and Schizophrenia: 
Anti-Oedipus (1972) and A Thousand Plateaus 
(1980), where the disintegrated body is 
considered as co-extensive with duration, and 
there is a significant shift from Bergson, in that 
the reference points (the body, the objects) 
become less defined and more interchangeable. 
According to Deleuze and Guattari, ‘[t]he BwO is 
opposed not to the organs but to that 
organization of the organs called organism … 
The Judgment of God uproots it (BwO) from its 
immanence and makes it an organism, a 
signification, a subject’ (2004, 158, 159). The body, 
in Deleuze, becomes reconceived as an 
aggregate, it is no longer the main reference 
point but rather any point whatsoever. 
Therefore, while the Bergsonian body correlates 
to a self that is changing yet endures; the 
Deleuzian body suggests a self that is 
continuously becoming. As such, the reference 
axis of the body dissolves in Deleuze’s writing, to 
be replaced by definitions of the body as ‘partial 
objects’, ‘couplings’ and machinic metaphors 
that re-construct the body as a multiplicity. 
Deleuze’s BwO results in a dispersal of the 
subject.  Ignasi de Solà-Morales understands the 
overarching intention of BwO as ‘the fragmented 
theory of the body and of the productive flows 
which the body gives rise to in order to explain 
the relationship that links the productive 
energies to late capitalism’ (1997, 23). 
Georges Teyssot elucidates how the BwO 
opposes the notion of ‘organic organization of 
organs, called organism’ in order to reverse the 
understanding of the organs (and their 
organization). Teyssot defines the BwO as a body 
‘purely in its exteriority, in relation to other 
bodies, perceived through relationships of 
surface, difference, affect, and desire’ (2013, 221). 
The organism on the other hand is defined as, 
‘conceiving the body exclusively in terms of its 
interiority, its regime of internal distribution, in 
which autonomous organs fragment the whole 
into multiple parts, breaking up its integrity’ 
(Teyssot 2013, 221). This articulation of the 
organism is reversed by Teyssot to suggest the 
formulation of organs-without a body, e.g. 
transplants, and grafts, that is, a hybrid that 
suggests another understanding of the body. The 
BwO becomes the polar opposite of ‘internal 
lack, higher transcendence and apparent 
exteriority’ (2004, 157). Deleuze and Guattari will 
claim that ‘the organism is not at all the body, 
the BwO; it is a stratum on the BwO, in other 
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words a phenomenon of accumulation, 
coagulation, and sedimentation that, in order to 
extract useful labor from the BwO, imposes upon 
it forms, functions, organization’ (2004, 159). This 
analysis of the BwO is comparable to this 
definition of the prosthetic body because this 
body is not codified, or stratified; it is in a state 
of becoming. The BwO is a means to destabilize 
the organization and subjection of the body by 
controlling bodies, and in order to do so BwO 
must mediate between the two poles. Here the 
political implications of the BwO are not directly 
relevant for this paper, the line of enquiry 
instead aims to seek how this BwO might re-
define our understanding of the image. 
The question I started off with cannot be 
properly framed by the subject-object 
relationship as defined by Bergson or indeed by 
Deleuze, because in the first case the subject-
object distinction is maintained (Bergson), whilst 
in the second case the dispersed subject is 
(intentionally) not specific enough (Deleuze’s 
BwO). The subject that I am considering here is 
in the process of becoming other to itself via its 
relation to an object, yet it remains a subject. 
Two examples will help to illuminate this 
understanding of the subject through the body: 
George Stratton’s mirror experiments (Gregory 
1997; Merleau-Ponty 2009)  and Jacques Lacan’s 
theorization of the Mirror Stage (Lacan, 2001). 
The account of the body by Teyssot serves as a 
starting point that both questions and develops 
the Deleuzian trajectory. The difference with 
what is suggested here is that in my own 
endeavour, the main object of inquiry is the 
cognitive body. In other words, my work explores 
how vision, mediated through devices, 
cognitively operates and formulates a new 
understanding of the image. Furthermore, the 
way we explain the organism needs to be 
scrutinized, beyond the epistemological 
explanation (as Deleuze suggests), by looking at 
the embodied perceptual experiments of 
Stratton. 
The embodied subject advocated in the 
binocular visual experiment by psychologist 
George Stratton (Gregory 1997; Merleau-Ponty 
2009) will serve as the initial analytical model to 
re-consider the body. Stratton’s device, 
constructed by mirrors attached to a harness, 
forces the operator to see the reflection of his 
body rotated by ninety degrees; the reflected 
body thus appears to hover horizontally at eye 
level. The vertiginous perception of one’s body is 
countered by the brain’s attempt to stabilize and 
restore the normalcy of perception, however the 
result is that the cognitive perception of the 
body, at the earlier stages of the experiment, 
dissociates from its spatiality. As Stratton 
claimed, ‘I had the feeling that I was mentally 
outside my own body’ (Gregory 1997, 205). As the 
body tries to adjust, the relationship between 
sight and touch manifests the proprioceptive 
associative learning between the two senses. 
Eventually, the body will adjust to its horizontal 
projection. For the purpose of this paper, I am 
interested in the stage of cognitive dissonance 
that occurs before the brain restores the image 
and the body adapts. According to Stratton’s 
experiment the body was positioned in a 
continuous loop of re-coordination, as it 
perceived the interface with its own virtual 
projection and tried to readjust to this sensory 
input. In relation to the Bergsonian body, in 
Stratton’s experiment whilst the primal image is 
referred to, what changes here is the 
relationship of the body to its peripherally 
perceived images. This experimental body does 
not simply create multiple and parallel feedback 
loops, but rather it disturbs the connection 
between exteroceptive and interoceptive 
cognitive associations. As the feedback of 
images dismantles the hierarchy of the body 
image over the image of the body’s perceptive 
field, the very boundary between the body and 
its enveloping space becomes less clearly 
defined.  
A similar state where the hierarchical 
relationship between the perception of body and 
its image is called into question can be found in 
Jacques Lacan’s seminal paper on the Mirror 
Stage (1949). In Lacan’s paper the infant’s 
confrontation with its reflected mirrored image 
is contraposed to the motor incapacity of its 
body. The infant’s body is situated between two 
poles, completeness (virtual image) and 
fragmentation (bodily motility), leading to the 
formulation of the “Ideal I” that the subject will 
perpetually strive towards; conforming to this 
image is what will constitutes the ego. 
In a somewhat reverse manner (developed 
bodily cognition becomes inhibited), the induced 
motor incapacity generated by Stratton alludes 
to a discrepancy between the image and the 
cognitive functioning of the body. Whilst in 
Stratton’s case the ego is already formed, its 
cognitive function is evidently in a state of 
disarray because the body becomes suffused 
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with its peripheral images. As the feedback of 
images in Stratton’s experiment dismantles the 
hierarchy of the body image over the image of 
external objects, the very boundary between 
space and body becomes less clearly defined; 
the body becomes rather immersed spatially. In 
order to develop this articulation of the body we 
can begin to define the technological interface in 
Stratton as a technological prosthetic. In these 
examples it is not the perceiving subject that is 
the reference point but rather this interface. The 
prosthetic here is defined as an active agent, as 
an object that affects the becoming of the 
subject, rather than assuming conventional 
definitions of prosthetic as supplement, 
extension or replacement.  While the infant’s 
body in the mirror stage is in a state of disarray, 
in Stratton’s experiment the body is perpetually 
dismantling visual perception and the interface – 
the object – is not acting on the subject simply 
as a supplement, but rather it actively consumes 
the subjective state. In this sense the dispersed 
body escapes representation altogether, it is in a 
state of perpetual disarray or becoming. 
Bergsonian Duration 
Returning to Bergson, there is one other 
important element in Bergsonian duration that 
we have not mentioned yet, namely memory. For 
Bergson the memory-image is made up of the 
pure past and active past that are ever creating 
the present moment. In Bergson’s diagram of the 
inverted cone – ‘which on the one hand could be 
said to figure the relation between the two 
memories [‘habit’ and ‘true memory’] (and to this 
extent to figure a relation between body and 
mind) [and] can also be interpreted to figure the 
mind itself – l’esprit …’ (Guerlac 2006, 152) – the 
pure past is the base of the cone, the apex is the 
very present, and the intermediary shaft is the 
active past. The active past defines the present – 
the apex – and at the same time always refers to 
the pure past. Memory as such is the element 
that provides a framework for Bergson’s 
definition of duration. But Bergsonian memory is 
directly related to a late nineteenth century 
understanding of the body. Contemporary 
understandings of the bodily schema, and the 
rethinking of the limits of the body through its 
intertwinement with technology produce a 
reconsideration of the cognitive corporeal body 
thus affecting the articulation of memory, in this 
case Bergson’s definition of memory. 
The understanding of the dispersed body 
that has been sketched out in this paper would 
affect the temporal relationship between the 
pure past, the actual past and the present. In 
Stratton’s experiment, for example, the apex of 
Bergson’s cone is changed: the point where the 
past is being actualized into the present 
becomes compressed, displaced, multiplied, 
creating the feeling of an expansive or multi-
present duration. Furthermore, the pure past, 
‘which never passes, remaining ever present but 
unrepresentable’ (Widder 2011) is submerged, 
while the active past, as ‘sensori-motor’, is 
enhanced. To sum up, the prosthetic articulation 
of the body developed here offers another way 
to re-conceive Bergson’s conic diagram, and the 
framework of the durational image. 
As the subject is being redefined through a 
prosthetic interface, it is thus changing not only 
its corporeality but also the way in which the 
body perceives duration. The bodily existence as 
a multi-present entity provides new conceptions 
for its representation. One could start to imagine 
this prosthetic interface as being both within 
and outside of the body, interchanging amongst 
these states, and forming the dispersed body. 
The development of this dispersed body can be 
better grasped by the Greek term for 
‘dispersion’. Diascorpisi combines dia – through 
or during – connoting a temporal attribute, and 
scorpisi – shedding. The Diascorpic Body, 
emerging in time, configures new 
understandings between the spatial body and its 
representation.  
The undefined image 
Working on this line of investigation, and in 
conversation with the theories it both embraces 
and questions, the diplorasis attempts to 
produce two superimposed durations. In order 
to further understand the meaning of duration 
assumed here we need to return for a moment 
to Deleuze’s reading of Bergson. In Bergsonism, 
Deleuze asks, ‘what is the framework common to 
recollection in the process of actualization (the 
recollection becoming image) and the 
perception image? This common framework – he 
argues – is movement’ (1988, 67). 
The sensorimotor functioning of the body 
here is thus extended beyond the perceptual 
image, and the perceptual image itself is derived 
from the recollection image. As Deleuze 
formulates the transition from recollection to 
perception to movement, he is explicit about the 
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starting point, as he notes: ‘We do not move 
from perception to recollection but from 
recollection to perception.’ The diplorasis aims to 
question this predefined trajectory. By altering 
the visual sensori-motor operations, the 
trajectory from the recollection image to the 
perceptual image becomes confused. This 
alteration of the visual sensori-motor operations 
produces an undefined image; the perception-
recollection trajectory can therefore be linked to 
another type of image: the dream-image. While 
Deleuze effectively develops his interpretation 
of Bergson’s concept of duration, he only briefly 
refers to the dream-image in a short paragraph. 
And when he does, he describes the dream-
image by stating: ‘it is as if the contraction were 
missing, as if the extremely expanded 
relationship of the recollection with the present 
reproduced the most expanded level of the past 
itself’ (1988, 67).  
In Deleuze’s explanation, the Bergsonian 
model of duration is adapted to the dream-
image. What Deleuze does not mention though, 
is how external and internal stimuli can also 
produce the dream-image; in other words, how 
movement–affection could trigger the 
recollection image.  
The diplorasis appropriates and 
implements the Deleuzian reading of duration, 
but it performs an attempt to reconfigure the 
relationship between its constituent elements, 
thus questioning the defined trajectory of 
recollection-perception-movement image. This 
occurs by interfering, in the first instance, with 
the eyes’ physiological mechanism through the 
active prosthetic interface. The device 
simultaneously engages with both the binocular 
and monocular operations of the eyes. As the 
monocular functioning of the stereoscope is 
enacted, at intermittent intervals the actual 
perceptual depth forces the operator to switch 
back and forth between binocular and 
monocular operations. This vertiginous 
overlapping between the actual and the 
reflected image introduces an unexpected and 
undefined image, where one observes oneself 
from outside their body image. The device 
operates between the representable and the 
non-representable, the virtual and the actual, 
the corporeal and the mechanical. It eradicates 
the singular perspectival point of view and 
involves multiple potentialities. As an example 
of an active, prosthetic, technological device, the 
diplorasis changes the human body and the 
bodily and visual perception of its environments. 
As a critical, speculative, theoretical device, it 
poses the question of how to represent this 
body and its “recollections”. 
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